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Kale: Practice and Procedure

PRACHCE AND PROCEDURE
I. PRETRIAL

A. Discovery
An important decision in the field of discovery was handed
down by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Cannon v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.1 The plaintiffs in this case
brought an action for wrongful death against the estate of Gordon E. Long and others. The defendant, Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., was joined upon allegations that it had negligently
manufactured and sold a defective tire, with which the Long
automobile was equipped, and the rupture of this tire was a
cause of the fatal collision. Goodyear's request to the executor
of the estate of Gordon E. Long for permission to inspect the
tire in his possession was refused and the defendant commenced
a special proceeding by service of a petition and rule to show
cause why inspection should not be allowed. The circuit court
granted defendant's petition to inspect the allegedly defective
tire.
On appeal the court held that a court of equity had inherent
authority in the promotion of justice and in the absence of a
statutory remedy to allow inspection of a chattel in possession
of an adverse party. The court distinguished the present case
from that of Welsh v. Gibbons2 in which the court refused a
motion for discovery in an action at law by observing that the
motion in this case was framed to invoke the equity jurisdiction
of the court. The court opined that although discovery was not
allowed in the courts of law, it was an original and inherent
power of the courts in equity.3
B. Venue
In Morse v. Moore Sand and Gravel Co.,4 the plaintiff brought
an action for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering
arising when the defendant-carrier's tractor trailer overturned
killing the plaintiff's intestate. Services of the summonses and
complaints were made on the Public Service Commission pursuant to section 10-430 of the South Carolina Code. The defend1. 248 S.C. 412, 150 S.E2d 525 (1966).
2. 211 S.C. 516, 46 S.E2d 147 (1948).
3. For a thorough discussion of this case see 18 S.C.L. lZv. 701 (1966).
4. 248 S.C. 380, 149 S.E2d 907 (1966).
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ant moved to vacate the services on the ground that the load of
gravel on the trailer at the time of the fatal accident was the
property of the defendant and was not being hauled for hire,
but for the exclusive benefit of the defendant. The motion was
overruled by the lower court.
The supreme court held on appeal that under the plain and
unambiguous language of section 58-1470, 5 a carrier licensed to
haul supplies in the county in which an accident occurred could
not avoid suit in that county even though the load he was hauling at the time was not hauled for hire but for his own benefit.
The practical effect of this decision is to make a motor vehicle
carrier subject to statutory substituted service any time it is
using the public highways, not just when it is hauling for hire.

C. Change of Venue
During the survey period the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered the question of change of venue in two cases. In
Oswald v. Southern Farmn Bureau Casualty Oompany,8 the defendants moved to have the venue changed to the county of the
defendant's residence. The lower court granted the motion.
Thereafter, the plaintiff successfully moved to have the venue
changed back upon grounds that the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice could best be met. On appeal, the
court stated that a motion for change of venue is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court that hears it, and that the decision will not be disturbed except by a clear showing of abuse.
This is a well settled rule in South Carolina.
In Moulds v. Blitch,7 the plaintiff brought action against the
defendant seeking damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been sustained as the result of a collision. The defendant moved
for change of venue under section 10-310(3) of the Code in
order to promote the convenience of witnesses and the ends of
justice. The plaintiffs contended in opposition to the change of
venue that having the trial in Darlington would be to their convenience as well as to that of their relatives who could lend
valuable testimony to the trial. The lower court granted the
change of venue expressing approval of the rule that the conS. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-1470 (1962) provides: "An action may be brought
against a motor carrier licensed under Article 3 of this Chapter in any county
through which the motor carrier operated."
6. 248 S.C. 433, 150 S.E2d 612 (1966).
7. 248 S.C. 459, 150 S.E.2d 917 (1966).
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venience of witnesses who are members of a litigant's family are
not entitled to the same consideration as that of other witnesses.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision. The
court reasoned that the rule approved by the lower court was
analogous to the rule adopted in some jurisdictions that the convenience of witnesses who are in one of the litigant's employ
will not be considered, at least not as strongly as the convenience
of other witnesses.8 The litigant's employee rule, however, has
been expressly rejected in South Carolina.9 The decision points
out the court's belief that any rule of this nature which distinguishes merely because of relationship is basically unsound.
In the federal court there were two cases decided involving
change of venue. In Mims v. Pr ctor and Gamble Distributing
Company 0 the court granted a change of venue and restated the
guidelines which must be followed in ruling on a change of
venue. Among these are the number of witnesses and the quality
of their testimony, the accessibility of witnesses and documents,
and the private interest of the litigant. The court also stated
that the weight to be given to the plaintiff's choice of forum is
lessened when the conduct complained of did not occur in the
forum selected. Likewise, the fact that the plaintiff may be
required to hire additional attorneys in the new forum should
be given no weight.
In Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corporation"lthe district court granted motions to transfer actions against the defendant airline to the district court in Oklahoma. The court,
while holding that the convenience of witnesses and ends of
justice could be best met in Oklahoma, also stated that South
Carolina has never adopted the new doctrine that has been accepted in other states that the forum state should apply a rule
of liability other than that of the place of the accident. 12 The
8. This rule has apparently been adopted in California, New York and a
few other states. See Annot., 74 A.L.R2d 16, 95 (1960).
9. See Cleland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 245 S.C. 478, 141 S.E2d 339
(1965) ; Sldnner v. Santoro, 245 S.C. 35, 138 S.E2d 645 (1964).

10. 257 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1966).
11. 263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967).
12. For a case showing the fortuitous nature of the place of the accident, see
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d
526 (1961). The court in that case stated:
The number of states limiting death case damages has become smaller
over the years but there are still 14 of them ... An air traveler from
New York may in a flight of a few hours duration pass through several
of these commonwealths. His plane may meet disaster in a State he never
intended to cross but into which the plane has flown because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent
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rule in South Carolina is that the law of the place where the
injury occurred governs with respect to rights of action.' Therefore, this doctrine cannot be used as an argument against
transfer.
D. RemovaZ of Cases
In

HRldieth v. General Instrment, Ine.,14 the plaintiff

brought an action for damages by making service in Darlington
County on June 27, 1966. On July 1, 1966, the defendant filed a
demurrer in the state court. On July 18, the defendant filed petition and bond for removal to the district court. The plaintiff
sought to remand the case to Darlington County because the motion to remove had not been made in time and because the defendant had waived his right of removal by filing the demurrer.
The district court held that under the new statute enacted on
September 29, 1965, the time for filing a removal had been
increased to 30 days.' On the second question as to whether the
defendant had waived his right to remove the case by demurring
in the state court, the court opined that the filing of the demurrer was not a waiver. In so holding the court recognized that
to hold otherwise would work a hardship and unjust forfeiture
of the defendant's right and would also have the effect of shortening the statutory period. This decision is illustrative of the
courts' reluctance in recent decisions to hold that parties have
waived their right of removal without a "clear and unequivocal"
showing.'
In another federal case, Dawlknis v. NationaZ Liberty Insurance Co., 17 the plaintiff filed action in a state court from which
there was removal by the defendants on petition and bond to the
district court. Thereafter the defendant moved for a dismissal of

the case on the ground that it did not meet the jurisdictional
amount. The plaintiff resisted the motion contending that when
may begin in one State and end in another. The place of injury becomes
entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if possible provide protection for
our own State's people against unfair and anachronistic treatment of the
law suits which result from these disasters.

13. See, e.g., Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937).
14. 258 F. Supp. 29 (D.S.C. 1966).

15. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. 1965) provides in part: "The petition for
removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after
the receipt of the initial pleading.....
16. See Champion Brick Co. v. Signode Corp., 37 F.R.D. 2 (D. Md. 1965).
See also C. WRIGHT, FEDE AL COURTS § 38 (1963).
17. 263 F. Supp. 119 (D.S.C. 1967).
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defendant filed its petition for removal, it alleged that the matter in dispute exceeded the jurisdictional amount. The district
court held that the defendant did not waive his right to challenge the jurisdiction of the court at a later time, since there
was no mention as to the jurisdictional amount. This procedure
would not of itself confer jurisdiction on the court.18
E. Joinder of Claims
In Airfare, Ino. v. Greenville Airport Commission,19 the plaintiff brought an action for breach of a lease contract, while also
asking for an injunction to prevent the defendant from further
interfering with the plaintiff's use of the leased premises. The
defendant moved to require the plaintiff to make an election as
to whether he was proceeding ex contractu or ex delicto and to
refer the case to the Master in Equity. The plaintiff conceded
that he was proceeding ex contraotu, but resisted the defendant's
motion to have the case referred to the Master in Equity. The
trial court granted the motion of reference and the plaintiff appealed.
The supreme court held that the main purpose of the suit was
to secure money damages for the breach of the contract. Since
no accounting was involved, and since the main purpose was
to secure money damages, the action did not fall within the compulsory reference of section 10-1402 of the Code. Therefore, the
plaintiff was entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right.2 0
The court opined that the logical choice was to try the legal issue
first, since if the facts did not show a breach of the contract,
then plaintiff would not be entitled to an injunction. The court
followed the settled rule that legal and equitable issues should
be separated and each tried by the appropriate branch of the
1
court.

2

F. Election of Remedy
Jacobson v. Yasehik 22 involved an action by the seller of corporate stock against the buyer, who was also president, general
18. See generally 76 CJ.S. Removal of Causes § 294 (1952).
19. 249 S.C. 265, 153 S.E.2d 846 (1967).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1403 (1962) provides that the order of reference in
an equitable action or of an equitable issue in an action at law may be general

of all issues of both law and fact but that this section shall not be construed so
as to deprive any party of a trial by jury of any case or issue upon which he is
entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right.

21. See Standard Warehouse Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 93,
71 S.E.2d 893 (1952).
22. 155 S.E2d 601 (S.C. 1967).
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manager, majority stockholder and director of the corporation.
The plaintiff alleged fraudulent breach of the fiduciary duty
owed by the defendant to reveal that he had previously negotiated to sell the entire capital stock. Plaintiff had sold her stock
to the defendant for $30,000, but under the defendant's later contract her stock would have had a value of $36,000. In her first
cause of action, the plaintiff asked that defendant be required to
account to her for all her proper pro rata share of the full value
received by him for the sale of the corporate stock and the distribution of the assets. On the second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that she had relied on the defendant's representations
to her injury and damage in the sum of $100,000. The defendant
moved to require the plaintiff to elect whether she would proceed under the first or second cause of action.
The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff had stated only
one cause of action, and therefore, although she has two remedies, one in equity and one in law, she was entitled to only one
recovery. The court further held in accord with the general
rule that when a plaintiff has a remedy at law and one in equity,
he may be compelled by court to elect whether he will proceed
with one or the other,23 but he will not be so compelled until
the defendant has answered. The rationale used is that the complainant is entitled to all possible information in order that he
24
may make an intelligent election.

G. Impleader
In the federal case of Sow v. Hertz Corporation,25 the administrator of the estate of the deceased brought action against the
defendant-automobile rental agency. At the time of the accident
the deceased's mother was the driver of the agency's automobile.
Hertz sought to make itself a third party plaintiff and to bring
in the driver as a third party defendant. The corporation contended that it could have no liability except through the driver,
23. See Thackson v. Shelton, 178 S.C. 240, 182 S.E. 436 (1935).
24. The court cites 25 Am. Jun. 2d Election of Remedy § 31 (1966), but it
is difficult from the court's decision to determine whether the complainant will

ever be required to elect before the defendant has answered. Amercian .urisprudence states that "where there is no controversy as to whether the two suits
are for the same cause or as to the adequacy of each remedy, or where it
appears that the court can ascertain all the material facts from an inspection
of the pleadings in an action at law and the bill in equity, an election may be
required at any stage of the proceeding." See also Fleming v. Courtenay, 95
Me. 135, 49 A. 614 (1901).
25. 262 F. Supp. 531 (D.S.C. 1967).
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that it should be able to recover from the driver any sums it is
required to pay, and that therefore the driver should be made
a third party defendant in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
The plaintiff presented to the court an affidavit showing that
the driver was virtually impecunious and had no personal automobile liability insurance coverage at the time of the accident.
The district court denied the defendant's motion to implead the
driver on the grounds that to do so would necessarily lead to
confusion and possibly prejudice. The court followed the rationale stated in Goodhart v. United States,2 6 that jurors would
likely render smaller verdicts where an individual, who is unable
to pay a substantial judgment, must be held ultimately liable.27
The fact that there was sworn testimony of the driver's impecuniosity and her close relationship with the deceased made it
apparent that the prejudice feared in the Goodhart case might
occur.
H. Specia Appearance
The plaintiff in Connell v. ConnZZ28 brought an action to
have a previous divorce decree modified by changing the visitation rights and by increasing the amount awarded for the support of herself and the children. The defendant filed an "answer
and return" objecting to the jurisdiction of the court in this
matter. Further allegations were made by the defendant with
regard to the method of service of the previous decree. The
court held that under section 10-648 of the Code, as well as
established case law, a party is allowed to appear for the sole
purpose of objecting to jurisdiction over the person, but if he
raises any other issues or files an answer before the objection
to jurisdiction is overruled, then he has made a general appearance.29
26. 26 F.R.D. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This case dealt with a motion to allow
impleader of the defendant's servant where the servant was financially unable
to make indemnity. See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 71 (1966).
27. More recent decisions have restricted the Goodhart decision so that a uniform approach might be kept, but have implied that where there is a special
showing of potential prejudice and definite proof of impecuniosity, the court
may deny the impleader. See, e.g., Smith v. Moore-McCormack, 31 F.ILD. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
28. 249 S.C. 162, 153 S.E2d 396 (1967).
29. See S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 210 S.C. 408, 43
S.E2d 132 (1947). S.C CODE ANN § 10-648 (1962) provides that: "Upon the
overruling of such objection to the jurisdiction and the giving of such notice
such party may thereafter appear generally or answer or contest upon the

merits

.

. . ."

(emphasis added).
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The court, however, went further and added that if the plaintiff were also contesting the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter, such an objection goes to the merits of the case and is
considered in law to be a general appearance. This point. seems
to have been previously undecided in South -Carolina. The court
in so ruling followed the rule adopted in North Carolina 0 and a
majority of the jurisdictions.
I. DeclaratoryJudgment
During the survey period there were two cases of some importance dealing with declaratory judgments. In Bank of
Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co.,8 ' the plaintiff-bank brought action against the defendants Satcher Motor Co. and others seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the priority of its chattel mortgage on an automobile over the claims of the defendants.
The defendants, Satcher Motor Company and Commercial Credit
Corporation, demurred to the complaint. The lower court overruled the demurrers and the defendants appealed.
The supreme court in affirming the lower court decision held
that a complaint is not subject to demurrer for failure to state
a cause of action for declaratory judgment if the facts alleged
show the existence of a justiciable controversy between the
parties,32 and the determination of the priority of mortgages on
the same chattel is such a controversy. The court also rejected
the defendant's contention that the action should be dismissed
because the plaintiff had other remedies available, stating that
this fact alone does not bar the action under the Code. 3
In a federal case, Lumberman's MutuaZ Casualty Company v.
Quieck, 4 the plaintiff insurance company filed suit for a declaratory judgment and also filed a motion with the court to issue
an order enjoining the defendant from further proceedings in the
state court. The plaintiff contended that the district court has
30. It re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 64 S.E2d 848 (1951).
31. 249 S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676 (1967).
32. See Hardwick v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 162, 133 S.E2d 71
(1963) ; Plenge v. Russell, 236 S.C. 473, 115 S.E2d 177 (1960) ; Dantzler v.

Callison, 227 S.C. 317, 88 S.E.2d 64 (1955).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2002 (1962) provides: "Courts of record within
their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed and a
declaratory judgment will be refused only where the other remedy would be
more effective or appropriate" (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of
this case see 19 S.C.L. REv. 451 (1967).
34. 257 F. Supp. 252 (D.S.C. 1966).
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under certain conditions and circumstances the power to enjoin
proceedings in the state court,3 5 and that it would be necessary

to enjoin the state proceeding in this case to protect or effectuate
the declaratory judgment. The court rejected these arguments
citing Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Yeatts"6 to the effect
that each of the courts may proceed with the case before it without reference to the other, except insofar as a prior decision in
one tribunal may constitute res judicata on one or more questions
involved in a later trial. Furthermore, the court opined that
where a suit could not have been brought originally in the district court except by declaratory judgment actionT and that
where no explanation is given as to why the declaratory judgment is equally available and equally efficacious in the state
court, the district court will dismiss the case without prejudice.
I.

TRTAL

A. Jury Trial
The case of Southern Railway Company v. Surety Insurance
Company"s raised an interesting question for the court. The defendant automobile insurer moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that the insured failed to comply with its obligation to
cooperate in the defense of the case by refusing to appear in
court as required by the provisions of the policy. The plaintiff,
thereafter, also moved for a directed verdict. The trial court
then ruled in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed
arguing that concurrent motions by plaintiff and defendant for
directed verdicts does not take the case from the jury and submit
all issues of fact and law to the court. Although the court agreed
with the plaintiff's argument, it nevertheless ruled that litigants
and counsel by their acquiescence had waived the right of a
jury trial and submitted all questions of fact and law to the
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgment"
36. 99 F2d 665 (4th Cir. 1938).
37. In the original action in tort brought in the state court, diversity of citizenship was lacking, and thus it could not have been brought in the district
court, nor was it removable to the district court Therefore, the only means of
getting into the district court was by filing a declaratory judgment. The court
quoted American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F2d 613, 617 (7th Cir.
1939) as follows: "The wholesome purposes of the declaratory acts would be
aborted by its use as an instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay
or to choose a forum."
38. 154 S.E.2d 561 (S.C. 1967).
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court. The rule of imputed waiver arising from the request of
each of the parties appears to have been the majority rule at one
time in the United States.8 9 While this rule has lost much of its
support, it is still adhered to by thirteen jurisdictions. However,
this form of procedure appears
never to have been adopted by the
40
courts of South Carolina.
In Baughman v. South Carolina Insurance Company,41 the
minor plaintiff brought action for injuries which he sustained
while a passenger in an automobile which collided with a school
bus at an intersection. The supreme court held that even though
a request for a charge to the jury is granted, a party cannot
complain of the court's failure to reopen arguments to the jury
where the refusal was invited by the party's failure to present
his contentions prior to the commencement of arguments to the
jury.
B. Nonsuit

In Gary v. Nationwide Insurance Company,42 the plaintiff
brought an action against two insurers to recover the amount of
a judgment against a third party. Upon conclusion of the evidence, the defendant moved for an involuntary nonsuit, which
was denied, and the defendant proceeded to offer certain evidence in support of his defenses. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought
to call one of the defendant's subpoenaed witnesses as a reply
witness, but he was not in the court room. The plaintiff's counsel
was aware that the witness had been subpoenaed, and the witness
had promised plaintiff's counsel that he would be in the court
at 10 o'clock, having been subpoenaed for 11 o'clock.
On appeal the supreme court held that granting the plaintiff's
motion for voluntary nonsuit without prejudice left the parties
precisely where they would have been had the defendant's motion
for an involuntary nonsuit been granted. The granting of an
involuntary nonsuit for insufficiency of evidence is not a decision on the merits and is not res judicata; therefore, the plaintiff could have brought the action again. This is settled law in
South Carolina.
The court further held that where there was no prejudice on
the part of the trial judge in granting the plaintiff's motion
39. See 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 342 (1945).
40. See Holliday v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 171 S.C. 250, 172 S.E. 219
(1933). See also Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 300, 303 (1959).
41. 249 S.C. 105, 152 S.E2d 733 (1967).
42. 249 S.C. 101, 152 S.E.2d 689 (1967).
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for a voluntary nonsuit. The court distinguished the present
case from that of Romanus v. Big g, 4 on which the defendants
relied. In that case, which was brought for a partnership accounting, it appeared that large losses had already occurred
because of the bringing of the suit and that a final decision was
necessary in order that the defendant might wind up his business
without fear of further interference and also to prevent further
losses. In Gary, the court followed the rule stated in Ralston
PurinaCo. v. O'Dell, "that a plaintiff is entitled to a voluntary
nonsuit without prejudice as a matter of right unless there is a
showing of legal prejudice to the defendant ....

Legal preju-

dice cannot be deduced from the fact that the granting of the
motion for a voluntary nonsuit would impose upon defendant
the necessity of defending another suit." 44
C. New Trial
In Mutual Savings and Loan Assnm v. Monarch Insurance Co.45
the mortgagee-beneficiary brought action against the insurer to
require payment under a fire policy, when the insured property
was destroyed by fire. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
in the lower court and the defendant gave notice of appeal. The
defendant in the lower court had pleaded that the owner of the
insured premises had obtained an additional policy from another
insurer, but the policy had never been introduced into evidence.
Sometime after the Master's report had been filed and judgment
rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant discovered that the
other insurance company had made a settlement with the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of afterdiscovered evidence. The motion was granted. The supreme court
in a split decision (4 to 1) held that defendant had not used due
diligence to bring the second policy before the court so that the
question of whether other insurance existed46 could be decided, and
was therefore not entitled to a new trial.
43. 217 S.C. 77, 59 S.E2d 645 (1950).

44. 248 S.C. 37, 148 S.E2d 736 (1966).
45. 248 S.C. 272, 149 S.E2d 633 (1966).

46. The court in Ortowsd v. Ortowski, 237 S.C. 499, 117 S.E2d 860 (1961)

stated that in a motion for new trial based upon after-discovered evidence,
the moving party must show (1)

that the evidence is such as will prob-

ably change the result if a new trial is granted (2) that it has been dis-

covered since the trial (3) that it could not have been discovered before
the trial by the exercise of due diligence (4) that it is material to the
issue, and (5) that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching.
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In Mie v. Coleman 47 the court restated the settled rule that
an order granting a new trial on factual grounds is not appealable, but the question of existence or nonexistence of evidence
is one of law, and to that extent such an order is subject to
review.
D. Iwonsistent Verdicts
In Rhodes 'v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc. 48 the plaintiff
brought an action for personal injuries received while shopping
in the defendant's store; and, in a separate suit, her husband sued
for the medical bills and loss of consortium. The case was submitted to the jury who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff wife but against the plantiff husband. The trial judge held
that the verdicts were inconsistent, allowing the wife's verdict
to stand and ordering a new trial as to the husband's case.
The supreme court held that a new trial should have been
ordered in the wife's case as well as the husband's, stating that
"the two verdicts neutralize, nullify and destroy each other and
must be disregarded." 49 There seems to be a split authority in
the United States on the question of inconsistent verdicts. Some
jurisdictions hold that where a verdict is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff wife for injuries, but denies recovery to a husband in
the same action for his expenses, the verdicts are absolutely irreconciliable and require a new trial on both claims.50 Other
jurisdictions have taken the opposite view that a new trial is
needed in only one of the cases.5 The court adopted the former
position because it was consistent with their prior rulings that
when "a verdict is so confused . . . that it is not absolutely clear
what the jury intended, the safest and best course for the court
to pursue is to order a new trial" 52 and to hold otherwise would
require the court to pass upon the evidence.
47. 248 S.C. 235, 149 S.E.2d 623 (1966).
48. 155 S.E.2d 308 (S.C. 1967).
49. Id. at 310.
50. This is apparently the rule in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and

Tennessee. See, e.g., Coleman v. New York Transit Authority, 28 Misc. 2d 694,
208 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1960) ; Watkins v. Myers, 12 NJ. 71, 95 A.2d 705 (1953) ;
Elser v. Union Paving Co., 167 Pa. Super. 62, 74 A.2d 529 (1950) ; Berry v.

Foster, 199 Tenn. 352, 287 S.W.2d 16 (1955).
51. This view has been adopted in California and Florida. See, e.g., Chance

v. Lawry's, Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185 (1962) ; Thieneman v. Cam-

eron, 126 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1961).
52. Lorick & Lowrance, Inc. v. Julian H. Walker & Co., 153 S.C. 309, 150
S.E. 789 (1929).
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SURvEED

III. APPEAL AND ERmoR
A. Notice of Motion
The plaintiff in Galloway v. Galloway5" had been granted a
divorce in 1955 and had since remarried. In April 1962, the
grandparents, who were the defendants in this case, instituted
an action for the adoption of the child. Approximately three and
one-half years after the rendering of the adoption decree, the
plaintiff brought this action by motion to have the adoption
decree set aside on several grounds, among which was that the
minor child had not been personally served, pursuant to the
adoption statutes then in effect. The record indicated that appearances had been made in behalf of the minor but that no
notice of the proceeding had been served upon her. The trial
court found as a fact that the minor had been properly served
in the preceding action, and therefore denied the plaintiffs
motion.
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the lower court's findings.
The defendants asserted several sustaining grounds including
the claim that the minor had not been made a party to the action
to set aside the decree and that no notice thereof had been given
to her or her guardian ad litem. The defendants, however, failed
to argue this point in their briefs. The supreme court stated that
although sustaining grounds not argued in briefs are usually
considered abandoned, "[t]he duty to protect the rights of
minors has precedence over procedural rules otherwise limiting
the scope of review and matters affecting the rights of minors
can be considered by the court ex mero motu." 4+ However, the
court, in a somewhat inconsistent manner, refused to pass upon
the issues affecting the rights of the minor, because notice of
the motion to set aside the adoption decree had not been given
to the minor.
B. Time for AppeaZ
In Thomas v. Rambler Center, Inc.,ss judgment was rendered
against the defendant in the county court of Charleston County.
Notice of intention to appeal to the circuit court was given by
the defendant seven days later. Upon motion by the plaintiff,
the judge of the county court dismissed the appeal as untimely
53. 249 S.C. 157, 153 S.E.2d 326 (1967).
54. Id. at 160, 153 S.E2d at 327.

55. 154 S.E2d 833 (S.C. 1967).
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because notice was not given within five days after judgment
as required by section 7-302 of the South Carolina Code. The
defendants contended that section 15-629.30 (1966 Supplement) 6
of the Code made section 7-405 and not section 7-302 applicable
to appeals from the county court to the circuit court, and that
under its provisions notice of appeal must be given within ten
days.
The supreme court held that section 15-629.30 provides that
any civil matter may be appealed from the county court where
the amount of the judgment appealed from is three thousand dollars or less. However, the failure to include specifically procedures for appeal to the circuit court in that section, showed the
intention that such appeals were to be controlled by the general
rules and practice already governing appeals from county courts
to circuit courts established in section 7-302.
RicnARD B. KAT,

JR.

56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-629.30 (Supp. 1966) provides:
In all civil actions and criminal proceedings and any special proceedings

of which the county court shall have jurisdiction, the right of appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court in the same manner and pursuant to the same
courts,
from circuit
appeals
govern of
now amount
procedure
rules,
or judgment
the verdict
whereas the
matters
that civiland
except practices

appealed from is three thousand dollars or less may be appealed to the
circuit court. Provided any such civil action, in which a notice of appeal
to the Supreme Court has been filed and where the brief of the respondent

has not been filed, may be transferred to the circuit court upon notice to
the respondent from the appellant.
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